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A NOTE TO THE READER: 
Pinyin System 
This thesis has generally adopted the Chinese Pinyin 
System of Romanization for transcribing Chinese names and 
places. Original spellings of names of persons and places 
have changed into Pinyin, which has been adopted by The 
New York Times for many years. For example, Peking is 
Beijing, Mao Tsetung is Mao Zedong and Liu Shao-ch'i is 
Liu Shaoqi, Chou Enlai ia Zhou Enlai. The original 
spelling is found only in quotations. 
The names of persons in this thesis are spelled in 
the traditional Chinese way, that is, surname first, 
except in the case of Nien Cheng, who chose to put her 
surname last in her book Life and Death in Shanghai. A few 
names of persons bear a hyphen between a two-word name. 
Such names were left as they appear in the quotations. 
Last of all, pinyin represent sounds similar to 
English sounds with only a few exceptions, such as c in 
Pinyin equals to ts in English; q equals to ch; x equals 
to sh; z equals to dz and zh equals to j. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Cultural Revolution 
The gunshots and bloodbath in the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre on June 4, 1989, shocked the entire world. In 
Beijing, reporters from many countries sent home pictures 
and stories as witnesses to the brutality of Communist 
power. 
In contrast to the media coverage by foreign 
reporters in this demonstration, 23 years ago American 
newsmen were not able to be present in China during the 
Cultural Revolution (CR) because there were no diplomatic 
relations between the two countries. However, The New York 
Times exerted great effort to inform American readers of 
this important event in China's contemporary history by 
reporting from outside China. 
Comparing the deaths and bloodshed of this 
demonstration in 1989 to those occurring in the CR, more 
people were affected by the CR. According to the Peo]2le's 
Daily, more than one million people died and 100 million 
1 
people were persecuted, arrested and tortured. Today any 
Chinese citizen between 30 and 40 years of age can recall 
1 
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30 and 40 years of age can recall ten turbulent years of 
disrupted family life and little formal education. The 
wounds of lost educational opportunity and shattered 
lives, in addition to a ruined economy and culture can 
still be felt today. 
In fact, the political campaign the Communist Party 
inflicted on the Chinese people had begun 40 years ago. 
Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China 
in 1949, the Chinese Communist Party, first headed by Mao 
Zedong, has launched a series of political movements that 
have drawn attention and energy away from the country's 
economic development. 
In 1958, Mao launched an economic campaign known as 
the "Great Leap Forward." Mao imagined that by engaging 
the whole nation, including its 80 percent agricultural 
population, in "basic neighborhood" industries, China 
might make a "great leap forward" to catch up with 
advanced industrial countries. On the contrary, the 
campaign triggered national famine for several years 
because the rural population, instead of growing 
agricultural products, was dragged into the so-called 
"basic neighborhood" industry, which they knew nothing 
about. 
In the 1960s the moderate policy represented by 
President Liu Shaoqi began to pull the country out of its 
economic backwardness. Liu's success made Party Chairman 
3 
Mao Zedong feel that he had lost face. He accused Liu 
Shaoqi of leading the country toward capitalism and 
decided that the "capitalist readers" should be 
overthrown. Mao's determination to overthrow all the 
"capitalist readers," aided by Lin Biao, Defense Minister, 
and Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, and her radical associates, 
produced the national tragedy known as the "Great 
Proletarian Cultural Revolution." 
On November 10, 1965, the Shanghai-based literary 
critic Yao Wenyuan, later identified as a member of the 
"Gang of Four," published an article in Wen Hui Bao, a 
major newspaper in China, attacking a historic play 
written by Wu Han, the vice-mayor of Beijing at that time. 
Shortly thereafter, Wu Han and his supporter, Peng Zhen, 
the mayor of Beijing, were purged. 
On May 16, 1966, the Central Committee of the Chinese 
Communist Party issued a document calling for all Party 
members to participate in the current political campaign. 
The document, known as the "May 16 Circular," served as a 
command to start the Cultural Revolution. It stated, 
The whole Party must follow Comrade Mao Tse-
tung's instructions, hold high the great banner of 
the Proletarian Cultural Revolution, thoroughly 
expose the reactionary bourgeois stand of those so-
called "academic authorities" who oppose the Party 
and socialism, thoroughly criticize and repudiate the 
reactionary bourgeois ideas in the sphere of academic 
work, education, journalism, literature and art and 
publishing, and seize the leadership in these 
cultural spheres. To achieve this, it is necessary at 
the same time to criticize and repudiate those 
4 
representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked 
into the Party, the government, the army and all 
spheres of culture, to clear them out or transfer 
some of them to other positions.2 
Within months, "bourgeois" academics and intellectuals 
were attacked. The attack soon spread to Party leaders and 
any persons in leading positions in society. The scope of 
the purge ranged from Liu Shaoqi to ordinary citizens who 
were descendants of former landlords and wealthy families. 
Lin Biao replaced Liu Shaoqi as Mao's successor at 
the Ninth Party Congress in 1969 and was appointed Vice 
Chairman of the Party. 
Mao soon became uneasy about Lin's power expansion in 
central and provincial governments. In September 1971, Lin 
Biao mysteriously disappeared from the public view. After 
ten months' silence about Lin's whereabouts, Mao began to 
tell foreign visitors that Lin had died in a plane crash 
outside China in an attempt to flee to the Soviet Union 
after he failed in a coup to assassinate Mao. 
After Lin's death, Jiang Qing and her radical 
associates became increasingly powerful for the next five 
years. After Mao's death in 1976, Jiang lost the power 
struggle between the radicals and the moderates and has 
been in prison ever since. The arrests of Jiang Qing and 
her followers were announced in the Chinese media as a 
"smashing victory" and marked the end of the CR. 
Beyond the struggle for power between Mao and his 
5 
successors, Mao used young students, known as the Red 
Guards, to attack millions of intellectuals, government 
officials, writers, films stars, sports stars, and 
descendants of former landowners and wealthy families. 
The Red Guards were high school and university 
students between the age of fifteen and twenty-five. In 
1966, Mao received thirteen million students at eight 
rallies in Beijing's Tiananmen Square between August and 
November. At the rallies, Mao Zedong encouraged the 
students that "To rebel is justified." The student 
representatives pledged that they would be "red guards 
3 
defending Chairman Mao and the Communist Party. 
According to Yan Jiaqi, author of Ten-Year History of 
China's Cultural Revolution, 
The duties of the Red Guards are to overthrow 
those persons in authority who are taking the 
capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the 
reactionary bourgeois academic authorities and the 
ideology of the transform education, literature and 
art and all other parts of the superstructure that do 
not correspond to the socialist economic base; to 
support the Vietnamese people in their struggle 
against the u.s. imperialists and revisionist 
elements; to destroy the old world and to build a new 
world; to take actions under the direction of the 
Cultural Revolution Committee.4 
The Red Guards first fought against school authorities 
on campuses and quickly moved their battlefields to 
society and among themselves. By 1968, Mao became 
frustrated by violence and turmoil and ordered the 
People's Liberation Army to restore order. The army took 
6 
over schools, factories, hospitals, government offices, 
department stores, radio stations, and newspapers, 
wherever the Red Guards had control. At the same time, Mao 
issued orders to send millions of Red Guards to the 
countryside to receive reeducation through hard physical 
labor under peasant supervision. Many of them found it 
difficult to adjust themselves in the countryside and 
returned to the cities where they grew up. Many of them 
retu~ned home and started to make trouble on the streets. 
After the CR, these Red Guards found themselves labeled 
the "lost generation." 
The New York Times 
The New York Times, located halfway around the world 
from China, is a newspaper well known for its domestic and 
international coverage. The Times has been proud that, 
Every morning at the breakfast table it brings to 
its readers the current history of the world. It 
records the dreams and hopes and accomplishments of 
millions of men and women all over the globe, and 
their disappointments and sufferings as well.S 
Harrison E. Salisbury, former reporter for The Times, 
described the newspaper as a "looking glass to history" 
6 
and a ~newspaper of record.'" 
One of the major factors that made The Times 
successful is that the newspaper has a very competitive 
and responsible team of reporters both in the United 
States and in many other countries in the world. 
7 
The Times has long stressed the responsibilities of 
its newsmen. As early as 1896 when Adolph S. Ochs took 
over the newspaper, the new publisher issued a statement 
that all the newsmen were required "to give al;L the news 
7 
without fear or favor." This statement has guided The 
Times newsmen in their work to this day. Arthur Hays 
Sulzberger, who succeeded Ochs on May 7, 1935, took over 
not only the newspaper but also Ochs' spirit of news 
reporting. In 1945, in a lecture on "The Newspaper, Its 
Making and Its Meaning," Sulzberger reinforced Ochs' 
philosophy: 
I don't suppose there are many in this audience 
or elsewhere who question that it succeeds. I take 
it that what we are interested in today is to see if 
we are performing our allotted task accurately, and 
without fear, and without favor.8 
The Times foreign news service has sent its newsmen 
to every important capital city in the world. It has set 
up bureaus in Asia, Africa, South America, Australia and 
Europe. 
The work of foreign correspondents differs from that 
of staff who work in the United States. The Times has 
decided that a foreign correspondent has to be more 
selective: "He has to include more interpretation in his 
dispatches if he is to fulfill his function of reporting 
9 
on the life of the country to which he is assigned." This 
decision is based on the fact that the American public 
needs background in order to be knowledgeable about other 
8 
cultures. 
The Times has defined four chief news sources for 
overseas reporters: 
1. Official news furnished by the government, which 
is highly important but often "slanted" for 
propaganda purposes; 
2. The opposition, which always exists, even when 
dictatorships have driven it underground, and 
which is eager to counter the claims of those in 
power; 
3. The local newspapers; 
4. And last and most important of all, contacts with 
individuals who have a flair for knowing what is 
going on, and who have demonstrated in the past 
their reliability.8 
The Times began to cover China as early as the 
beginning of the century when the country was governed by 
the Qing dynasty. Since then it has followed the ups and 
downs of the country. In the 1940s, The Times staff 
followed the Nationalist regime from Beijing to Nanjing 
and Chungging; they also interviewed the Nationalists' 
opponents, the Communists in Yenan and Shanghai. 
China was a closed country before Nixon's visit in 
1972. During the CR, The Times watched Beijing from Hong 
Kong, the closest place to China. Seymour Topping, Charles 
Mohr, Tillman Durdin, James, Reston, Henry Lieberman and 
Fox Butterfield all filed stories from The Times office in 
Hong Kong. 
In April 1971, Durdin became the first American 
newspaperman to report from China. Max Frankel had an 
9 
opportunity to enter China in February 1972 when he was on 
a special assignment to cover Nixon's visit. Fox 
Butterfield became The Times first Beijing bureau chief 
in December 1979 after China and the United States 
normalized their relations. 
Therefore, most China stories during the CR were 
"off-the-spot" coverage. Lieberman described how the 
overseas correspondents reported the CR from outside 
China. He said, "with travel restricted, Communist 
functionaries aloof and Chinese afraid to talk to 
foreigners, journalistic activity in any mainland city 
today would amount primarily to monitoring the local 
11 
press." Unfortunately, the local press was not a 
reliable source because newsmen in China had to follow 
instructions about what to report. 
Under such difficult conditions, Lieberman believed 
that the difference between good and mediocre reporters is 
the "difference between digging carefully for available 
12 
information and not digging at all." The Times reporters 
made the best of the situation by whatever means were 
available and dug out information via the "spoken word, 
the printed publication, and the dots and dashes of 
domestic press transmissions tapped out in standardized 
13 
Chinese number code." Sometimes they had to piece 
together the accumulated information and explain, 
interpret or comment on it. 
10 
Value of the Study 
In examining how well The New York Times reported the 
CR 23 years ago even without having its reporters 
physically present in China, the thesis studies how close 
Times' stories are to the facts of the CR revealed in the 
aftermath by insiders and survivors. The results of the 
study also show the quality and ability of The· Times' 
foreign correspondents working under difficult conditions. 
In addition, the thesis examines what sources The 
Times used, who the reporters were, what was in their 
stories of each event and how the reporters speculated, 
interpreted and explained the situation, especially when 
the Chinese media were silenced or slanted. 
Method and Scope of the Study 
This thesis presents a historic review of the CR and 
examines how well The Times reported the event from 1966 
to 1976. The examination of the report and reality of the 
CR has focused on four major events, namely, Liu Shaoqi's 
fall and wide purge at the beginning of the CR, the rise 
and fall of Lin Biao, Nixon's China visit and the arrests 
of the "Gang of Four," which marked the end of the CR. 
This study used The New York Times Index and reviewed 
about 30 stories of each event from The New York Times. 
-----
Following a historic description of the selected event, 
the thesis employs qualitative content analysis 
methodology to examine The Times coverage of the 
corresponding events during the CR. 
11 
The introduction chapter describes the Cultural 
Revolution and The New York Times' philosophy of running 
the newspaper, especially its policy for foreign 
correspondents. 
Chapter II reviews literature about the CR by Chinese 
and American writers. 
Chapter III examines the wide purge and the fall of 
Liu Shaoqi, former President of China, the rise and death 
of Lin Biao, as well as The Times' report on these events. 
Chapter IV examines China's foreign policy during 
CR, focusing on Nixon's China visit and Sino-u.s. relations 
and related reports from The Times. 
Chapter V presents the arrest of the "Gang of Four" 
at the end of the ten-year-old Cultural Revolution and 
the report by The Times. 
Chapter VI covers the summary, discussion and the 
recommendations of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Among Chinese authors who wrote about the Cultural 
Revolution, Liang Heng, Gao Yuan, Nien Cheng and Yue 
Daiyun recorded in detail their personal experiences 
during the CR. Among American writers, Harrison Salisbury, 
Fox Butterfield, Anne Thurston and Ross Terrill 
investigated and interviewed people who survived the CR. 
Liang Heng and Gao Yuan shared similar experiences 
as Red Guards. When the CR began in 1966, they were both 
teenage boys. Gao Yuan, author of Born Red, was from a 
revolutionary family in a county town in Hebei province. 
Gao described his involvement in mass rallies against 
"reactionary" teachers and administrators, marching them 
on the streets, beating them and driving some of them to 
suicide. 
Gao recalled that the Red Guards ended up in fighting 
with other factions. They turned the schools into armed 
camps, claiming that they would guard Mao Zedong and his 
revolutionary line at the cost of their lives. Once when a 
friend of Gao's was hit in the forehead by a sharp rock, 
Chairman Mao's teachings gave them encouragement to 
13 
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continue the fight. They memorized these lines from Mao's 
Little Red Book, "We are learning about warfare from 
--- 1 
engaging in warfare." 
When Mao called for the Red Guards to resettle in the 
countryside in 1968, Gao realized what was waiting for him 
and decided, "I don't want to be a peasant for the rest of 
2 
my life." He joined the army instead, hoping to "continue 
3 
the revolution." 
Liang Heng was from Mao Zedong's native province of 
Hunan. His mother had been labelled "antiparty" and 
"rightist" before the CR. His father, a newsman at the 
Hunan Daily, was accused of opposing the Party and the 
socialist system. Nevertheless, Liang managed to join the 
Red Guards with other 'teenagers. Liang recalled a horrible 
scene during the CR in Son Of The Revolution: The streets 
of Changsha, the capital city of Hunan province, "ran with 
4 
blood in the humid hundred degree heat of August." 
Liang was sent to the countryside with many other Red 
Guards in 1968. However, like many other students who could 
not adapt to life in the countryside, Liang returned home 
and ended up on the street drinking and fighting with 
other sons and daughters of the revolution. 
Nien Cheng, author of Life and Death in Shanghai, 
was born to a wealthy family, and married the general 
manager of Shell Oil's office in Shanghai. Her privileged 
family background was often the target of the Red Guards. 
15 
Cheng recalled that one night in 1966, a crowd of young 
students forced their way into her house, smashing 
whatever they could find. She tried to explain that some 
of the antiques she had collected for many years were 
irreplaceable. The Red Guards said to her, 
You shut up! These things belong to the old 
culture. They are useless toys of the feudal emperors 
and the modern capitalist class and have no 
significance uses to the proletarian class. They 
cannot be compared to cameras and binoculars, which 
are useful for our struggle in time of war. Our great 
leader Chairman Mao taught us, 'If we do not destroy, 
we cannot establish.' The old culture must be 
destroyed to make way for the new socialist culture.S 
Cheng was first put under house arrest and then sent to 
prison, where she was in solitary confinement more than 
six years. Cheng was almost destroyed physically, and yet 
her strong will sustained her survival. 
Among the victims of the CR, Chinese intellectuals 
suffered most. Yue Daiyun, a female literature professor 
at Beijing University, witnessed many deaths of innocent 
people. Almost every day she heard news of suicides or 
people beaten to death by the Red Guards. 
Once when Yue Daiyun went to see her mother in 
hospital, she saw a nurse wheeling in a cart on which lay 
the body of a teenage girl who was obviously beaten to 
death. Yue recalled, 
Since she had been dead upon arrival, no one had 
bothered to cover her with a sheet. Across her chest 
were two paper banners, one announcing her identity 
as a 'counterrevolutionary bastard dog' and the other 
proclaiming, 'Anyone who opposed the Cultural 
16 
Revolution will come to no good end.' Her face and 
hair were matted with blood.6 
Lin Zhao, a student of Yue's, had written several 
poems protesting the privilege of the Communist Party. Lin 
had also secretly translated the manifesto of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party which she believed was less dictatorial. 
She kept her ideas in a diary which was discovered by the 
Red Guards. She was soon sent to prison. Later, Yue 
learned that in her cell, 
Lin was crippled by arthritis, her condition 
aggravated by the dampness of her cell. She looked 
close to death in her white prison uniform, with her 
hair uncut, her finger gaunt, her complexion pale. In 
spite of her failing health, she had apparently 
continued to write poems on scraps of toilet paper, 
sometimes with her own blood.? 
In 1968, Lin Zhao was sentenced to death for attacking Mao 
Zedong and the Communist Party. 
Fox Butterfield of The New York Times, author of 
China: Alive in the Bitter Sea, learned Lin Zhao's story 
from three reporters at the New China News Agency. In 
their account, some government officials went to the 
Shanghai home of Lin's mother telling her that her 
daughter had been executed three days earlier for the 
counter-revolutionary crime in her diary. But the money 
spent on the execution had to be paid by the mother. 
Butterfield wrote, "the officials demanded that the mother 
pay five fen, a little more than three cents, to cover the 
cost of the bullet they had put through the back of her 
17 
daughter's head" because the money spent on the execution 
8 
had been a waste, according to the sardonic officials. 
In 1979, following the normalization of relations 
between China and the United States, The Times opened its 
office in China. Having reported for four years from Hong 
Kong, Butterfield moved to Beijing where he had a chance 
to listen to people talking about the CR. He learned that 
almost all the Chinese he met had been compelled to turn 
in their valued books, records, or paintings to the 
fanatic Red Guards who ransacked their homes looking for 
"decadent bourgeois or feudal culture." He also learned 
that most of China's leading writers, musicians, and 
artists were imprisoned and.some of them were tortured to 
death. Lao She, author of Rickshaw Boy was "forced head-
down into the bottom of a muddy lake by a band of Red 
9 
Guards till he drowned." Butterfield was impressed by 
what Liao Mosha, a distinguished writer who was imprisoned 
for thirteen years, said that the CR actually destroyed 
10 
China's traditional culture. 
Harrison Salisbury, author of several books about 
China, considered that the key to understand China was to 
understand the CR. He interviewed people.who had been 
involved and asked many questions of what had happened to 
them during the CR. Salisbury wrote in To Peking and 
Beyond, 
I am sure that there is much that I still do not 
18 
understand, but I have learned enough to know no one 
can begin to comprehend China today, no one can begin 
to draw conclusions about the nature of the country, 
the quality of the people, the inner meaning of 
Chinese policy, the psychology of her leaders or her 
attitude toward the world and toward the United 
States, without grasping the essentials of the 
Cultural Revolution. If there is in China a New Man, 
if China is creating the pattern of the world's 
future, the secret, I think, must lie in the Cultural 
Revolution.11 
Salisbury visited several universities such as Hunan 
Science and Engineering University, Wuhan University and 
Qinghua University---the latter as highly regarded as MIT 
in the United States. He noticed broken window panes in 
all the classrooms he visited and learned there had been 
violent physical combat and rifle fire in these 
universities~ As his interviews developed, Salisbury felt 
that it was becoming more and more clear that violence was 
12 
one of the "salient features" of the CR. 
From 1981 to 1982 Anne F. Thurston, author of Enemies 
of the People, conducted 49 interviews with the survivors 
of the CR both in China and in the United States. Thurston 
specifically described a situation in which the Red Guards 
were "criticizing" You Xiaoli, a female university 
professor who was accused of being a counterrevolutionary. 
Thurston wrote, 
You Xiaoli was standing, precariously balanced, 
on a stool. Her body was bent over from the waist 
into a right angle, and her arms, elbows stiff and 
straight, were behind her back, one hand grasping the 
other at the wrist. It was the position known as 
~doing the airplane.' Around her neck was a heavy 
chain, and attached to the chain was a blackboard, a 
19 
real blackboard, one that had been removed from a 
classroom at the University where You Xiaoli, for 
more than ten years, had served as a full professor. 
After doing the jet airplane for several hours, 
listening to the endless taunts and jeers and the 
repeated chants calling for her downfall, the chair 
on which You Xiaoli had been balancing was suddenly 
kicked from under her and she tumbled from the stool, 
hitting the table, and onto the ground. Blood flowed 
from her nose and from her mouth and from her neck 
where the chain had dug into the flesh.13 
Thurston described the brutality of the CR in yet 
another example: 
Zhao Shuli, one of China's leading twentieth 
century novelists, had died as a result of a similar 
incident. A rib had broken and punctured his lung 
when the chair had been knocked from beneath the 
stool on which he had been standing. Accused of being 
a counterrevolutionary, he was not eligible for 
medical treatment. Instead, he was dragged to another 
city to face yet another struggle session against 
him. He died several days later.14 
Today any Chinese citizen 30 years of age or above 
could recount similar situations they saw with their own 
eyes during the CR. Many of them witnessed violence, 
shootings, bloodshed and death. Thurston concluded that 
the CR was surpassed only by the Nazi holocaust, the 
15 
Stalinist purges, and genocide in Cambodia. 
20 
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CHAPTER III 
POWER STRUGGLE BETWEEN MAO AND HIS SUCCESSORS 
The Purge of Liu Shaoqi 
Liu Shaoqi was born in 1898 into a wealthy family in 
Mao's native province of Hunan. Liu was a few years 
younger than Mao. He joined the Communist Party through 
Mao's introduction· in 1921. In the same year, Liu enrolled 
in the School for Foreign Languages set up by the 
Communist Party and was chosen with seven other students 
to study for two years at the Eastern University·in 
Moscow. After his return to China in late 1922, Liu spent 
six years leading the workers' movement of the Communist 
revolution in the areas controlled by the Nationalists. 
In October 1934 Liu Shaoqi participated in the Long 
March as chief of the Political Department of the Eighth 
Corps of the Red Army and later served in the same 
position in the Third Corps. From 1945 to 1955 Liu served 
as General Secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat. 
On April 28, 1959, he was elected the President of the 
People's Republic of China. After Liu came to power, he 
supported economic development, a policy which was 
different from that of Mao. Liu's success with the 
21 
22 
national economy triggered Mao's criticism. Mao began to 
1 
accuse Liu of leading the country toward capitalism. 
The Difference Between Liu and Mao 
Mao began his career as a rebel leader in the 
peasants' movement in Jiangxi Province in the early 
1920's. His education was based on traditional Chinese 
culture. It is obvious from the literary allusions in 
Mao's widely published poems that Mao had widely read 
classical Chinese novels and history and studied each 
palace coup of China's ancient dynasties. 
Liu Shaoqi received extensive theoretical education 
on Communism in the Soviet Union in early 1920s. Liu was 
a well-trained orthodox Communist. 
During the time of great difficulties for the 
Communist Party, Mao and Liu supported and complemented 
each other against their common enemies: the Japanese 
troops and the Nationalists. After the Communists carne to 
2 
power, their relationship began to sour. 
Before 1966, the Party Chairman and the President of 
the state were almost evenly matched in strength. Mao's 
advantages were his public image built up over the years, 
the armed forces and his propaganda machine. Liu's power 
carne from the support he had won in government 
organizations at both central and local levels. 
As Liu's strength grew stronger, Mao became more 
23 
afraid of losing power. In 1965 Mao began to complain that 
Liu and other government officials treated him as if he 
were their "dead parent at a funeral" and they "never 
3 
bothered to consult me on vital matters." 
In order to take the power from the opposition, Mao 
launched the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." It 
took Mao three years to purge Liu Shaoqi from his 
positions. At the beginning, Liu was criticized without 
his name being mentioned. The May 16 Circular of 1966 
described Liu as China's Khrushchev who had served as the 
commander of the anti-Mao, anti-party and anti-socialist 
4 
group. 
In early 1967, tens of thousands of Mao's Red Guards 
gathered at Zhong Nan Hai where Liu had lived and ·worked. 
Liu was forced to bend his back before the angry crowd to 
recite Mao's quotations from the Little Red Book and to 
make a confession. 
On January 25 of the same year, the Liberation Army 
Daily published an editorial entitled "The People's 
Liberation Army Firmly Supports the Proletarian 
Revolutionary Faction," claiming that the army was committed 
to destroying the bourgeois headquarters headed by Liu 
Shaoqi at the central, provincial and municipal government 
5 
levels. In July, the People's Daily described Liu as a 
6 
"drowning dog" which should be struck to its end. 
Historian Li Tien-min wrote in Liu Shao-ch'i that by 
24 
1968 the power struggle in CR had become an "undisguised 
personal vendetta" against Liu, for the purpose of 
"stripping away his power, his influence, and the ideology 
7 
he represented." 
An editorial of the Liberation Daily on November 11, 
1968 implied that the purge of Liu Shaoqi was almost at an 
end. It indicated "the very exposure of Liu Shao-ch'i is a 
gigantic achievement for the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution, even if the revolution has accomplished 
8 
nothing else." Liu had been placed under house arrest by 
the Red Guards in early 1967 until he died in disgrace on 
December 12, 1969. 
The Times Report on Liu's Fall and 
the Wide Purge 
In the 1960s The New York Times reporting on China 
heavily relied on monitoring Chinese official media from 
.Hong Kong and using sources of other countries. Liu's name 
was not found in Chinese media in 1966 and 1967. In May, 
1968, when China first publicly attacked Liu in the 
Liberation Army Daily, The Times ran a story from Agence 
France-Press entitled "Peking Calls Liu Agent of Chiang." 
The story began by pointing out that Liu was accused by 
the official press for the first time of representing the 
interests of the Nationalists. To be a Nationalist agent 
was considered to be a deadly charge because among Chinese 
Communist class enemies, Nationalist agents were the 
9 
"lowest form," the story explained. 
25 
The same story suggested that the accusation against 
Liu was aimed at purging Mao's opponents both in the 
Party and in the government. It indicated that the Mao-Liu 
relation had come to an end by this point when "charges 
apparently indicated that there was no longer any 
possibility of a compromise between Mr. Liu and the 
10 
present leaders of China." 
Another Times story depicted China's "victory" over 
the battle against Liu Shaoqi. Written by Hong Kong based 
reporter Tillman Durdin on November 1, 1968, the story 
headlined "Chinese Reds Expel Liu From the Party" 
indicated that the Chinese Communist Party "formally 
expelled Mr. Liu, the country's disgraced head of state, 
11 
from the party and other posts." Durdin quoted the 
Chinese press as denouncing Liu by name as a "traitor, 
renegade and scab" and a "lackey of imperialism, modern 
12 
revisionism and the Kuomintang." 
Meanwhile, the Chinese media were hailing the 
decision to expel Liu from the Party as a "sweeping 
success" and declaring that "all policies laid down and 
actions taken under the leadership of Mao and his deputy, 
13 
Lin Piao, have been correct," the story added. Durdin 
also noted that it was the first time since late 1966 that 
Liu was identified by name in an official Party 
26 
declaration and the first time he was connected with the 
14 
term "counter-revolutionary crime." 
In the background information, Durdin noted that Liu 
was first made a target of the CR in 1966, after serving 
20 years as Mao's chief aide. The spearhead that brought 
him down was the "militant students," known as the Red 
15 
Guards. 
While Liu Shaoqi was under attack, a sweeping purge 
was under way in Beijing. Beginning on February 16, one of 
the stories entitled "2 Peking Writers Accused of 
Criticizing Regime" reported that one of the prominent 
writers, Wu Han, Deputy Mayor of Beijing, was under attack 
for a play he wrote. The play, titled Hai Rui Loses His 
Office, was about Hai Rui, the Minister of revenue in the 
Ming dynasty (1644-1912), who was dismissed from office 
and jailed for criticizing the emperor. In Chinese 
history, he has symbolized honesty, integrity, and 
uprightness in public officials. As the result of his 
virtue, he offended the emperor and lost his position. The 
play encouraged people to speak the truth and to criticize 
the wrongdoings of the top leaders. 
The Times interpreted the play as angering the 
"regime because it suggested that traditional moral values 
16 
could be taken over by contemporary society." The play 
was first criticized in Wen Hui Bao in November 1965 and 
had since been denounced in most major newspapers in 
17 
China. 
27 
Another literary figure under attack was Tien Han, a 
leading playwright, who also had written the words for 
China's national anthem. His play Xie Yao-huan was about 
an imaginative historical heroine during the Tang dynasty 
(618-907), who opposed official corruption and petitioned 
the Empress Wu Zetien for political reform. Eventually 
Xie failed to persuade the court and was killed by the 
intrigues of corrupt officials. 
The People's Daily was first to accuse Tien of 
distorting history and preaching an idealistic historical 
viewpoint. The Times commented that the Chinese press 
accused Tien of borrowing historical characters.and 
incidents to·attack the current government. The Times 
story also compared the situation of writers in China in 
the 60s with that of in the Soviet Union in the 30s. It 
concluded that the "Soviet writers have considerably more 
18 
freedom." The Times story quoted the New China News 
Agency as saying that "160,000 literary and art workers 
had gone to factories, rural areas and armed forces to 
19 
~remold their thinking.'" 
The purge began in cultural fields and spread to the 
whole society in the three-year period from early 1966 to 
the end of 1968. Durdin reported that "Communist China is 
experiencing a period of intense political purging known 
20 
as ~purifying the class ranks.'" The reporter explained 
28 
terms used in the Chinese media such as "class enemies," 
who were supposed to be dragged out from the working 
class. He said that the label "class enemy" can be 
applied to "anyone with an even remotely bourgeois 
background or pinned on individuals who have been 
opponents of the military dominated revolutionary 
committees, the new ruling bodies in the cities and 
21 
villages of China." The term "seven black elements" 
used in the Chinese media referred to "former landlords, 
former rich peasants, rightists, former capitalists, 
counter-revolutionaries, bad elements and black 
22 
gangsters." In analyzing the purpose of the purge, 
Durdin remarked that "one seems to be to root out these 
elements. Another is to crack down·on detractors and 
23 
opponents of the new power-holders." 
The Rise and Fall of Lin Biao 
When CR began in 1966, Lin Biao was actively engaged 
in doing three things: attacking Liu Shaogi who was on his 
way to the top leadership as Mao's successor, providing 
Mao with a personality cult in order to gain his favor, 
and increasing the strength of his clique. Meanwhile, Mao 
badly needed Lin's military force to overthrow Liu Shaogi 
whose power had endangered Mao's position. 
In public, Lin Biao created an image of being most 
loyal to the Party Chairman by holding Mao's Little Red 
29 
Book in hand at all times, meanwhile, increasing military 
personnel at both local and state levels of government. 
China scholar John Gardner recorded in Chinese Politics 
and the Succession to Mao that by 1969, 
Army representatives were found throughout 
society: in local administration, in industrial 
enterprises, and in educational institutions. It 
appeared then that the army controlled China, that 
Lin Biao controlled the army and that Mao had given 
his blessing to a new successor. 24 
In the Ninth Party Congress held in April 1969, Lin's 
status as Mao's successor was written in the revised Party 
Constitution, 
Comrade Lin Piao has consistently held high the 
great red banner of Mao Tsetung's thought and he has 
most loyally and resolutely carried out and defended 
Comrade Mao Tsetung's proletarian revolutionary line. 
Comrade Lin Piao is Comrade Mao Tsetung's closest 
comrade-in-arms and successor. 25 
In this Congress, Lin's speech pronounced the final 
sentence on Liu Shaoqi, calling Liu a "hidden traitor and 
scab," "a crime-steeped lackey of the imperialists," 
"modern revisionists and Kuomintang reactionaries," and 
"the arch-representative of the persons in power taking 
the capitalist road." From then on, Liu disappeared from 
the stage of the Chinese politics forever. 
Four years later, the lOth Party Congress dramatically 
and officially overturned the decision about Lin's 
position as Mao's successor made in the previ~1s Congress. 
It proclaimed on August 29, 1973, 
The congress indignantly denounced the Lin Piao 
30 
anti-Party clique for its crimes. All the delegates 
firmly supported this resolution of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China to expel 
Lin Piao, the bourgeois careerist, conspirator, 
counter-revolutionary double-dealer, renegade and 
traitor from the Party once and for all!26 
In fact, Lin's fall and death had occurred two years 
earlier. As Lin's power continued to grow after he rose to 
the number two rank, Mao grew increasingly uneasy and soon 
begari to take actions to strengthen his own power. 
In August 1971, Mao left Beijing in a special train 
for central southern and eastern China to strengthen his 
own support from military leaders in those areas. Mao was 
planning to organize a show down before Lin's supporters 
27 
were properly organized. 
During his tour, Mao stayed in Wuhan for ten days 
holding talks with senior leaders of Hubei and neighboring 
provinces. In his conversation with those senior leaders, 
Mao implied, "a certain person was very anxious to become 
28 
state Chairman, to split the Party, and to seize power." 
In Gardner's account, "By the evening of 6 September 
Lin was fully informed of what Mao had said, and his 
29 
understandable reaction was to panic." Lin and his wife 
directed their son Lin Liguo, an Air Force commander, to 
take action in Shanghai, where "B-52," a code name for 
Mao, would stop on his itinerary to return to Beijing. 
Lin Liguo, instructed his followers that "three methods of 
assassination were being considered: ~using flame throwers 
31 
and 40-mm bazookas to attack B-52's train, or using 
reassembled 100-mm artillery to shoot the train, or 
alternatively having Wang Weiguo carry out the murder with 
30 
a pistol while being received by B-52 on the train." 
Mao was aware of the emergency situation. On 
September 8, Mao suddenly changed his schedule and ordered 
the train to move only a few minutes after he finished his 
midnight snack. Two days later, Mao suddenly changed 
again: "Now turn the train back. We shall leave right 
away!" By constantly changing his schedule, Mao safely 
31 
arrived in Beijing on September 12, 1971. 
Upon learning that Mao reached Beijing, Lin and his 
wife decided to flee. Lin Doudou, Lin Biao's daughter from 
a previous marriage, reported to Premier Zhou Enlai that 
her father intended to make an unexpected night flight. 
Zhou immediately decided to ground all flights as a 
precaution. He ordered that any flight would have to be 
authorized by three signatures: his own, Lin Biao's, and 
32 
the authority ordering the flight. At the airfield, Lin 
Biao, as the number two man in the Party and the future 
head of the state, forced the Trident to take off shortly 
before 1:00 a.m. on September 13 and headed north. An 
hour later, it crashed in the Mongolian People's Republic, 
killing all the people on board. 
Ironically, on the same day of Lin Biao's fall, the 
People's Daily carried an article in praise of Lin, 
32 
Comrade Lin Piao has at all times held high the 
great red banner of Mao Tsetung Thought. He has at 
all times defended Chairman Mao's proletarian 
revolutionary lines and put it into practice, and he 
has always been a shining example to the whole Party, 
to the Army, and to the people of the whole 
country!33 
During the following months, this "shining example" 
was not mentioned again by the Chinese media. When Lin 
Biao's name reappeared, he became a "pseudo-Marxist 
political swindler like Liu Shaoqi," and "army-splitter," 
"a conspirator, opportunist, renegade and traitor." 
Finally, he became "dog-shit, indigestible to human 
34 
society." 
The Times Report on Lin Biao 
on May 15, 1966, one day before the CR officially 
began, Seymour Topping of The Times, reported from Hong 
Kong that Lin Biao "appears to have emerged as a dominant 
figure in the country's affairs after a political struggle 
35 
in Peking." Topping remarked that the emergence of Lin 
"signaled the beginning of the current purge of 
intellectuals and of officials of the Peking municipal 
37 
Party organization." The story noted that in the last 
months of 1965 and the early months of 1966, Lin 
apparently was preoccupied with a campaign within the army 
to "improve tighter political control over senior 
commanders who were not responding to Mr. Mao's 
37 
ideological directions." 
33 
During this period, The Times reporters, unable to do 
interviews in Beijing, had to base their stories on the 
Chinese media and to listen to what the specialists and 
the analysts had to say. Topping's story is an example: 
"According to provincial radio broadcasts, an army-led 
campaign against antiparty, antisocialist elements" has 
38 
been extended to the rest of the country." The story 
indicated that "people in the provinces are being told 
that they should be guided by editorials in the army 
39 
newspaper," which was under Lin's control. 
On August 16, 1966, Salisbury wrote a story with the 
headline, "Mao's Effort to Steal China's Youth Is Seen 
Behind Purge." A question Salisbury raised in the story 
was, "Who were the participants?" He explained that while 
some China watchers picked on Lin Biao, others disagreed 
40 
because his health was too poor. Salisbury speculated 
that Deng Xiaoping, "the tough, durable secretary general 
of the Party," might be the major purger. On the contrary, 
instead of being the man behind the purge, Deng became the 
41 
second victim after Liu Shaoqi's fall. 
Salisbury soon changed his mind. Two months later, 
Salisbury wrote on the same subject that "Chinese Reds 
Begin Drive to Glorify Lin Piao," suggesting that the 
emergence of the Defense Minister marked a turning point 
in Chinese history. Salisbury remarked, 
A campaign has been launched in China to glorify 
34 
Lin Piao, the Defense Minister, and underline his new 
role as heir apparent to Mao Tsetung, the Communist 
Party's Chairman. This represents a significant shift 
in emphasis on the part of Peking. Until recently Mr. 
Lin was content to stand in Mr. Mao's shadow and be 
acknowledged simply as the Party leader's chief aide 
and spokesman. Today he is being praised and his 
name is appearing more frequently in the press as the 
authoritative voice of the hierarchy.42 
As Lin's power increased, Salisbury indicated that it was 
difficult to tell "just where Chairman Mao's authority 
43 
ends and Mr. Lin's begins." 
Meanwhile, the praising of Lin became an important 
political task for the Chinese media, headed by the 
People's Liberation Army Daily and reproduced by other 
newspapers. A Times story quoted the military paper as 
praising Lin who had "always implemented Chairman Mao's 
thought and followed his correct line most faithfully, 
44 
firmly and thoroughly." 
In analyzing the purposes of the current propaganda 
campaign, the story suggested, "The intensified adulation 
of Mr. Lin" was aiming at: 
1) increasing Lin's stature in preparation for his 
eventual succession to Chairman Mao; 
2) strengthening his hand for further purging of 
important party figures.45 
The Times was able to keep a good record of Lin's 
public activities until September 1971, when suddenly it 
lost his track. Silent about Lin Biao for a couple of 
weeks in September, The Times began to speculate on his 
whereabouts on October 1--the Chinese National Day. A 
35 
story noticed that the People's Daily omitted publishing 
the "customary large photos of Chairman Mao and Deputy 
46 
Chairman Lin Piao." 
A week later, The Times reported that Premier Zhou 
met Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in Beijing. The story 
referred to members of the delegation who said that they 
47 
were not certain whether Lin was present." 
On the same day following the previous story, The 
Times ran another story under the headline of "The Lin 
Piao mystery," that, 
All China watchers have noted recent signs of 
shifts and changes and particularly the nonappearance 
of such prominent personages as Vice Chairman Lin 
Piao and other top army men.48 
The mystery remained for the rest of the year in China. 
On December 2, 1971, Tillman Durdin, by sorting the 
facts from Chinese media which deliberately omitted the 
name of their target, said that "Peking Denounces 
Plotters in Party Attack on Lin." He noted that a joint 
editorial in Beijing's leading newspapers charged that the 
"chieftains of opportunist lines were intriguing against 
49 
Communist unity in China." 
Durdin commented that the editorial was the 
"sharpest" and most "outspoken" official attack in 
connection with the "protracted absence of Mr. Lin." 
Instead of mentioning his name, the editorial labeled Lin 
and his associates as "bourgeois careerists," "splitters" 
50 
and "sham Marxist schemers," Durdin added. 
36 
The Chinese government disclosed Lin's fall on July 
27, 1972, almost ten months after Lin's death on September 
12, 1971. In fact, The Times' conclusion about Lin's fate 
had been arrived at six months earlier than the Chinese 
media actually disclosed the news. In December, 1971, 
Durdin concluded, "It now seems likely that Mr. Lin 
gradually came to realize that Mr. Mao and his supporters 
were moving to downgrade him and that Mr. Lin's actions to 
combat this led to confrontation in September that Mr. Lin 
51 
lost." 
37 
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CHAPTER IV 
CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS; 
THE NIXON VISIT 
Background 
Before the Cultural Revolution, China had established 
formal diplomatic relations with 46 countries. Sixteen of 
them were in Asia, 13 in Africa, 16 in Europe, and one in 
Latin America. 
When the CR began, China's relations with other 
countries began to sour dramatically. Of 46 ambassadors, 
45 had been called back to Beijing. The only country that 
had retained a Chinese diplomatic envoy was Egypt. 
Meanwhile, constant military conflicts escalated the 
tension on the Sino-Soviet border. By the end of 1971, the 
Soviet Union increased its military buildup along the 400-
1 
mile border to about forty-four divisions. The two 
countries were on the edge of war. The serious Soviet 
military threat led Premier Zhou Enlai to readjust China's 
foreign policy. He persuaded Mao to send the ambassadors 
back to the countries with which China had diplomatic 
relations before the CR. Meanwhile, China began to search 
for a counter-balance against the Soviet Union. The United 
40 
41 
States was on the top of its list. 
In a 1970 interview with American writer Edgar Snow, 
Mao had indicated that Richard Nixon would be welcome in 
Beijing. The informal invitation soon reached Washington. 
Shortly thereafter, the President referred, for the first 
time, to "Red China" as the People's Republic of China. 
As a response, China invited the U.S. table tennis team to 
China in April 1971. In July, Henry A. Kissinger, 
Secretary of State, secretly visited China, preparing the 
way for President Nixon's visit the following February. 
The Times Report on China's 
Foreign Relations 
In Durdin's account, the reason China recalled its 
ambassadors stemmed from clashes between Chinese diplomats 
and local authorities of the host countries, as Chinese 
officials were trying to spread the CR fever to the local 
Chinese population in 1966. Durdin briefly described the 
scene: "In Hong Kong, Peking partisans attempted an 
uprising, while in Burma pro-Peking Chinese went on a 
rampage of violence. Foreign envoys in Peking and some 
2 
foreign missions were subjected to attacks." 
By 1969 China had already realized the seriousness of 
being isolated from the outside world and had begun to 
improve its relations with other countries. On October 14, 
1970, after 20 mcnths of talks, China established 
42 
diplomatic relations with Canada, a big step on the road 
toward restoring foreign relations with other countries. 
Meanwhile, the Canadian government broke relations with 
the Nationalist government on Taiwan. 
On October 14, 1970, the day that China and Canada 
declared their decision, The Times reported that "Canada 
3 
Set Up Ties To Red China and Drop Taiwan." The story 
quoted a joint conununique by the Chinese and Canadian 
governments issued in Beijing: "The Canadian Government 
recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of 
China as the sole legal Government of China." The story 
indicated that "the issue of Taiwan's status had been the 
chief element delaying the agreement on mutual 
4 
recognition" for 20 months. 
Following Canada's move, the United States 
established diplomatic relations with China in less than 
two years. Meanwhile, The Times was closely following 
China's diplomatic actions. 
On November 24. 1970, The Times reported "Moscow and 
5 
Peking Conclude One-Year Agreement on Trade;" on January 
6 
6, 1971, "Conununist China Recognized by Chile;" on 
January 23, Japan's desire to improve relations with 
7 
China. At the same time, The Times observed China's 
actions in improving relations with Arab and African 
countries. 
Ihsan A. Hijazi, The Times Arab reporter, indicated 
43 
8 
that Beijing was "Widening Ties With Arabs." The reporter 
recorded that China's exports to Arab markets in 1970 
"increased 10 per cent over the period of 1967 to 1969. 
9 
The increase totaled about $200 million." The story noted 
that China's major trade partners in the Arab market were 
Southern Yemen, the Sudan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq, Libya, 
Syria, and the United Arab Republic. 
Another story stated "China Quietly Renewing An 
10 
Active Role in Africa." From Nigeria William Borders 
reported that China had recently established diplomatic 
relations with Nigeria, Ethiopia and Equational Guinea, 
and at the same time, inaugurated a $400 million railway 
project in Tanzania and Zambia. Borders indicated that 
China had been engaged in many activities in Africa "with 
a zeal that often surpasses that of advisers from other 
11 
countries." 
The Times Report on U.S.-China 
Relations 
In June 1971, The Times reported the first signal 
sent by the Nixon Administration to improve relations with 
China. Tad Szulc reported from Washington that the U.S. 
government decided to lift its ban on "travel by Americans 
12 
to Communist China." The Nixon Administration was aiming 
at creating "broad opportunities for contacts between the 
13 
Chinese and American people," the story explained. In 
44 
contrast to China travel, the story revealed that the u.s. 
government still banned Americans from travel to North 
14 
Vietnam, North Korea and Cuba. 
A further step toward the normalization of Sino-u.s. 
relations was taken on April 10, 1971, when a "15-man U.S. 
15 
Table Tennis Team Crosses Into China From Hong Kong." 
The event was well-known as "Ping-pong Diplomacy," the 
prelude to a relationship between China and the United 
States. The following day, China granted visas to three 
16 
American journalists entering China. 
The ping pong story about the 15 team members 
entering China reported the facts about the visit as a 
plain sports event. The story included time, place and 
people who were involved in the event. This story did not 
connect the sporting event with politics. 
However, the second day story changed the theme. The 
Times interpreted the event as a symbol of a thaw in the 
relations between the two countries. In Washington, Ian 
Stewart wrote that many government officials viewed the 
granting of the visas to American newsmen "as a further 
sign that China was moving to discard its policy of self-
17 
isolation." Stewart connected the invitation to the 
table tennis team and the granting of the visas to 
American journalists as the "first positive response" by 
the Chinese government to the Nixon Administration's 
decision to lift bans on travel by Americans to China. The 
45 
reporter referred to these signs as "major events in what 
has been a sterile history of relations" between the two 
18 
countries. Stewart anticipated that, sooner or later, 
these major events could possibly lead to a broad range of 
19 
exchanges in many fields." 
Since the Communist Party took power in 1949, only 
two American journalists had been permitted to visit 
China. The year 1957 brought in William Worthy who worked 
for the Afro-American newspapers and the Columbia 
Broadcasting System. Prior to 1970, Edgar Snow twice 
visited China. 
Stewart referred to an informed source as saying that 
"local Communist officials appeared 'shell-shocked' by the 
20 
sudden shift in Peking policy." 
To summarize the American position about the exchange 
of newsmen, The Times recalled that the American 
government had called for an exchange as early as 1964, 
and again in 1966. The u.s. government informed China 
through ambassadorial meetings in Warsaw that Chinese 
newsmen could visit the United States "despite the Chinese 
21 
ban on American reporters." However, Stewart said that 
China did not respond to the American moves. 
On the other hand, the story recorded the Chinese 
position on this issue. Stewart indicated China had 
declared that "so long as the principal issue of Taiwan 
was unresolved there co~ld be no progress on 'secondary 
46 
22 
issues.'" However, the breakthrough of China's policy 
change indicated that "applications for visas by other 
23 
American correspondents might be favorably received." 
Another step toward normalizing relations was taken 
by the U.S. government. Robert B. Semple Jr. reported in 
June 1971 that "President Ends 21-year Embargo On Peking 
24 
Trade." Semple said that President Nixon "authorized the 
export of a wide range of nonstrategic items and he lifted 
all controls on imports from China." The White House 
considered these moves as more political than commercial. 
The Nixon Administration overtly declared that "Chinese 
products are sold at a political price without regard to 
25 
cost." Thereafter, the pace toward normalizing the 
relations between the two countries escalated.· 
A month later, The Times disclosed, "Nixon Is 
Expected To Visit China Around End Of Year; To See Both 
26 
Mao And Chou." The same story also revealed that 
Kissinger visited China from July 9 to 11 and forged the 
agreement with the Chinese leaders that President Nixon 
would visit Beijing as soon as possible. The story 
described how Kissinger walked in the press room after his 
49-hour visit to China "with a broad smile on his face, 
27 
obviously pleased with the outcome of his trip." 
However, the White House was not totally optimistic 
about Nixon's future visit to China. Some u.s. government 
officials worried about "certain risks" in dealing with 
47 
China. They understood that the Chinese government 
considered American support for the Nationalist government 
on Taiwan an obstacle on the road toward improved 
relations between the two countries. 
The Taiwan issue remained an obstacle not only in 
U.S.-China relations but also on China's road to U.N. 
recognition. The American delegation to the United 
Nations, headed by George Bush, drafted a resolution to 
keep the Nationalist government in the U.N. while 
admitting China. The special resolution addressing 
"important questions" required a two-thirds majority vote 
from the representatives. 
On October 26, 1971, the General Assembly voted, as 
The Times put it, "overwhelmingly to admit Communist China 
28 
and to expel the Chinese Nationalist government." The 
story said that the result of the voting was a last battle 
on the part of the United States to keep the Nationalist 
29 
government in the U.N. in the 22nd year. That same 
American delegation had played a major role in keeping the 
Chinese Communists out of the U.N. since 1961. 
When the voting results were announced, the story 
.went on, "as the electrical tally boards flashed the news 
that the ~important question' proposal had failed, 
pandemonium broke out on the Assembly floor. Delegates 
29 
jumped up and applauded." On the contrary, the American 
31 
delegation "sat in total dejection." The story quoted 
Bush in responding to the situation that he hoped the 
world organization would "not relive this moment of 
32 
48 
infamy." Bush was further quoted as saying, "It's hard 
to believe that a few hours ago we didn't think we had 
33 
anything to worry about." 
On February 10, 1972, after the Taiwan delegation 
walked out of the U.N. building, The Times reported that 
34 
"President Calls On Taipei And Peking To Negotiate." In 
this story, Tad Szulc wrote from Washington about the 
change in Nixon's attitude toward the Taiwan issue. He 
quoted President Nixon: "The ultimate relationship between 
Taiwan and the mainland is not a matter for the United 
36 
States to decide." This change laid a foundation for 
the leaders of the two countries to surmount the obstacle 
of the Taiwan issue when they came to the negotiation 
table. 
However, three weeks before Nixon's China visit, The 
Times remarked that there were still some uncertainties 
and doubt about Nixon's trip. In an opinion piece 
headlined "Nixon Turns to China," James Reston wrote, 
"what then, it is asked, can Mr. Nixon hope to get out of 
36 
the China visit? In tangible terms, probably not much." 
Reston raised the Taiwan issue and was not optimistic 
about the solution. He reasoned that on Taiwan, the 
President was "almost certain to be asked why he still has 
several thousand troops in what Zhou Enlai considers a 
province of China, and how would Mr. Nixon like it if 
37 
China stationed troops in Hawaii or Long Island'?" 
49 
Therefore, in expressing very limited expectations about 
Nixon's visit, the writer suggested that "the President is 
undoubtedly right to minimize the expectations of the 
38 .. 
American people before he leaves." Reston was convinced 
that the negotiation simply could not go beyond cultural 
and trade exchanges. 
The Times Report on the Nixon Visit 
President Nixon's hope to visit China materialized 
on February 21, 1971, in spite of various concerns and 
doubts. Max Frankel, on a special assignment to report 
Nixon's China visit for The New York Times, filed his 
first story about Nixon's arrival in Shanghai: 
President Nixon arrived in China this morning to 
mark the end of a generation of hostility between the 
United States and China and to begin a new but 
undefined relationship between the most powerful and 
the most populous of nations.39 
Premier Zhou Enlai was waiting with the reception 
committee at Hong Qiao airport in Shanghai. His handshake 
with President Nixon reminded Frankel of the hand that 
"Secretary of State John Foster Dulles spurned at the 
Geneva Conference in 1954, when the memories of conflict 
between China and the United States in Korea were still 
raw and their contest over Indochina had just been 
40 
joined." 
50 
But this time, the handshake "symbolized the end of 
41 
American ostracism of his Communist Government." Due to 
the fact that there were no formal diplomatic relations 
between the two countries, the reception ceremony was 
short and small in scale: "The moment that has been so 
elaborately labeled as historic by the President and by 
many other Americans passed swiftly into history," wrote 
Frankel, who perceived the reception ceremony as a 
42 
"studiously correct but minimal official welcome." 
In 1972, the Cultural Revolution was still underway. 
The American delegation could see some signs and could 
sense this political event everywhere they passed. Frankel 
noticed that "Mr. Mao's portrait stares down upon visitors 
from prominent positions at both the Shanghai and the 
Peking airports and from many of the prominent buildings 
of the capital along the drive to the government guest 
43 
house, where the Nixons will be staying." Some slogans 
expressing China's foreign policy against the United 
States and the soviet Union were still on display. One of 
them "complains of the ~bullying by United States 
imperialism and by social imperialism'--the latter 
expression being a euphemism for the Russians." Another 
slogan "warmly hails the great victories of the three 
Indochina peoples in their war against United States 
imperialism." A third slogan was about the support to Arab 
countries "in their struggle against U.S. imperialism and 
51 
44 
Zionism." These slogans obviously suggested to the 
American delegation that they had landed in a country that 
was very different from their own. 
Despite the differences between the two countries, 
the negotiators from both sides decided to search for more 
communication over issues of common concern including 
Taiwan and the Vietnam War. President Nixon articulated 
the common ground in his toast at a banquet with the 
Chinese leaders: "There is no reason for us to be enemies. 
Neither of us seeks the territory of the other. Neither of 
us seeks domination over the other. Neither of us seeks to 
45 
stretch out our hand and rule the world." 
On the second day of the visit, this headline 
dominated the front page of The Times: "Nixon Spends An 
Hour With Mao And Then, At A Banquet, Hears Chou Toast His 
46 
Trip As ~Positive.'" 
Unfortunately, The Times was unable to report the 
Mao-Nixon meeting in further detail because no media were 
allowed during the meeting. 
When the Taiwan issue was addressed in the Nixon-Zhou 
meeting, leaders of both sides agreed that the Taiwan 
issue was crucial in the negotiation. American officials 
insisted that the United States was committed to defend 
Taiwan under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, while Chinese 
leaders asserted that "Taiwan is part of China" and that 
the Taiwan issue "remained ~the crucial question 
52 
47 
obstructing' normal relations with the United States." 
At the end, the American leaders expressed their wish that 
the Taiwan issue could be settled by "the Chinese 
48 
themselves." 
Frankel noticed that during the negotiation, Zhou was 
confident that both governments would work "through common 
49 
efforts" to normalize their relations. The "common 
efforts" were summarized below: 
They found each other useful, sharing parallel 
concerns about the Russians, holding common concerns 
about the Japanese, groping for a new post-Vietnam 
balance in Asia and wondering why they had ever 
permitted themselves to become such passionate and 
obsessed enemies.50 
As a result, the Chinese leader promised to keep in touch 
with the American government through various channels. 
Zhou agreed to "facilitate" further "unofficial contacts" 
in science, technology, culture, sports and journalism and 
to "permit the progressive development of trade with the 
51 
United States." 
When the eight-day visit came to an end, President 
Nixon found himself parting with an "American pledge to 
arrange a gradual withdrawal of United States forces from 
Taiwan and a joint pledge for a gradual increase in 
52 
American-Chinese contacts and exchanges." Frankel quoted 
President Nixon who contended that "this was the week that 
53 
changed the world." 
As a witness of Nixon's China visit and reporter for 
53 
The Times for this special coverage, Frankel concluded 
that both Nixon and Zhou found that they were much closer 
to the normalization of relations between the two 
countries. At the end, Frankel wrote that President Nixon 
was heading home with a "conviction that bo_th governments 
were committed to ~build a bridge' across the Pacific and 
54 
22 years of hostility." 
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CHAPTER V 
THE GANG OF FOUR 
Background 
Mao's death on September 9, 1976 left a vacancy in 
the supreme position in China's political apparatus, and 
consequently, created another power struggle among China's 
top leaders. The two major rivals for the top leadership 
were Premier Hua Guofeng, Mao's chosen successor, and 
Jiang Qing, Mao's widow. Hua gained the upper hand in the 
power struggle and ordered the arrest of Jiang and the 
other three politburo members who had supported her. The 
other three persons were Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan and 
Wang Hongwen. These four politicians were labeled the 
"Gang of Four" inunediately following their arrests in 
October, 1976. 
Jiang Qing, a Shanghai actress in the late 1930s, 
joined the revolution led by Mao Zedong in Yenan, Shanxi 
Province, where she met and married Mao. Jiang's first 
taste of power was bestowed by Lin Biao who appointed her 
chief adviser to PLA on opera, dance, music, and novels, 
in 1966, the year that the CR began. A few months later, 
Mao made his wife deputy head of CR's leading group. Of 
57 
58 
the five members in this group, three were "Gang of Four" 
elements, namely, Jiang Qing herself, Zhang Chunqiao and 
Yao Wenyuan. 
The first target of this group was Liu Shaoqi, whose 
high position had threatened Mao. Meanwhile, Jiang kept a 
close relationship with Lin Biao because both Mao and 
Jiang understood that they needed the army to secure their 
power. With Mao and Lin, the two most powerful men behind 
her, Jiang directed a wide purge through Red Guard violence. 
Between 1966 and 1968, Jiang frequently visited 
Beijing University where she talked to the Red Guard 
organizations and encouraged them to use violence against 
"capitalist readers." I'n two years, more than 52 percent 
of the National Political Consolidation members and 65 
percent of the Party Central Committee members were forced 
by violence to confess that they were "traitors," "spies," 
"counter-revolutionaries," "capitalist-readers," and 
1 
"revisionists," and consequently removed from office. 
Jiang's power had been dramatically increased since 
1966. Her name was routinely listed first in rank when Mao 
was away from Beijing. On many occasions she received 
leaders from other countries in the name of the top 
leader and stole most of the spotlight from the media. 
Historian Ross Terrill, author of Madame Mao, the White-
Boned Demon, remarked that "turn on the TV and there was 
her face; open the newspaper and there was news of her 
59 
2 
activities." 
The "Gang of Four" was also known as the "Shanghai 
Gang" because all four persons had Shanghai connections. 
Jiang met both Zhang and Yao in Shanghai in the 1930s. 
At that time, Zhang was the head of Wen Hui Bao, and later 
rose to be Party chief of Shanghai. Yao was a Shanghai 
writer and literary critic. Their relationship had 
continued for 30 years and reached its climax during the 
CR. In Terrill's analysis: "The loyalty of Zhang and Yao 
to Jiang Qing was due to her charm, her left-wing views on 
3 
arts, and the appeal of her proximity to Mao." 
Wang Hongwen was almost 30 years younger than the 
other three. Starting as a security guard in the No. 17 
Textile Mill in Shanghai, Wang joined the clique in 1966 
when he was in his thirties. Gardner noted that Wang 
"threw himself into the violent political struggle which 
convulsed that city and mobilized workers in support of 
4 
Zhang Chunqiao." Promoted by Jiang, Zhang and Yao, Wang 
rose to Vice-Chairman of the Municipal Revolutionary 
Committee of Shanghai in 1972. At the same time, he was 
Political Commissar of the Shanghai Military Garrison and 
the head of the Shanghai Union Federation. In 1973, the 
Party's Tenth Congress appointed Wang Vice-Chairman of the 
Party, the same position Lin Biao formerly held. 
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The Times Report on the Gang of Four 
In a country like China where politics are tightly 
controlled from the top, so is the information. Any detail 
of the procedure of selecting a new leader can be handled 
in total secrecy. After Nixon's visit to China in 1972, it 
was much easier for the United States to send newsmen to 
Beijing, but it didn't mean that gathering news was easy. 
For an event like the purge of the "Gang of Four," foreign 
newsmen had to start with speculation. 
Before China officially released the news of the 
arrests of Jiang Qing and her associates, the speculation 
was mostly based on wall posters on school campuses. In 
China, the media served as instruments conveying the voice 
of the Party only. During the CR, Mao encouraged the Red 
Guards to use dazibao, a Chinese term for wall posters, to 
express their love of Mao and hatred of the "counter-
revolutionaries." Not long after, dazibao spread to the 
whole society. 
The first story in The Times about the Gang of Four 
appeared on October 12, 1976, a week after their arrests. 
Written by Ross H. Munro of Canadian Globe and Mail, the 
story, disclosed in "Mao's Widow, 3 Shanghai Radicals 
Reported Held for Plotting a Coup" that "mounting evidence" 
in Beijing seemed to suggest that the "Gang of Four" had 
5 
been arrested about a week earlier. The Munro story, 
61 
based on a dazibao on the campus of the Foreign Languages 
Institute in Beijing, declared that some signs indicated 
that Hua Guofeng had gained the upper hand in the power 
struggle. The dazibao disclosed that "Chairman Mao had 
made arrangements before his death for Hua to succeed 
6 
him." Another dazibao obviously suggested the same: "In 
one army compound, posters announced the appointment of 
Mr. Hua as Chairman and called for uniting around the 
7 
Party Central Committee headed by him." 
The story characterized the "Four:" Jiang was called 
a "key influence on her husband and one who helped 
radicalize the content of art, literature and music in 
China during the past decade." Wang was said to "rank 
second in the Communist Party hierarchy." Zhang "ranks 
fourth" among the Chinese leaders, and had been considered 
as a "potential Chairman or Prime Minister." Yao, who 
"ranks sixth, has exerted significant control in recent 
years over the press, which has tended to reflect a 
8 
radical line." 
On the same day, following Munro's story, Butterfield 
filed "'No Comment' in Peking," in which the reporter 
indicated that the Chinese officials used an unusual "no 
corcunent" in response to the arrest of Jiang Qing. 
Butterfield commented that "In the past, Chinese spokesmen 
have usually immediately denied reports they considered 
9 
untrue." But this time, they neither denied nor supported 
62 
the report. Therefore, Butterfield was confident that the 
unusual "no comment" meant silent agreement. 
Following Butterfield's story, The Times ran sketches 
with mug shots of the four leaders reportedly being 
10 
purged. The sketches can be surmnarized thus: 
Jiang 2!!!9: 
Once an obscure Shanghai actress known as Lan Ping 
Came to rank high in the Beijing hierarchy as the 
wife of Mao Zedong 
Most prominent member of the Party's radical 
faction and nation's most powerful woman 
Inconspicuous in her role as Mao's wife and mother 
of one daughter before Mao pushed her into the 
limelight to guide cultural affairs 
Banished many earlier works of drama, art and music 
and promoted the output of operas, ballets, dramas 
and musical works that advocated new Maoism 
Played key role during the CR 
62 years old 
Zhang Chunqiao: 
An original member of the radical "Shanghai set" of 
the Communist Party 
A Deputy Prime Minister and possibly a candidate for 
party leadership 
Propagandist for Communist in World War II 
Became leader in art and literary circles in 
Shanghai after Communist takeover in 1949, when he 
began to climb party's leadership ladder 
Catapulted into prominence in the CR 
One of four remaining members of the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo at time of Mao's 
death 
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Wang Hongwen 
A radical in the Mao tradition, Party's deputy 
chairman, second in rank 
In his early 40s, the youngest of Party's leaders 
A charismatic leader from Shanghai, not considered 
a favorite for Party leadership 
Political apprenticeship rooted in the CR 
Yao Wenyuan 
A propagandist from Shanghai and leading figure 
among leftist radicals 
Came to prominence in the CR 
Set the tone of the CR with editorials; dealt with 
matters of ideology, Party organization and 
propaganda 
On the following day, The Times ran a story from 
Reuters with the headline of "Photos of 4 Leftists 
Withdrawn in Peking." Based on past experience that 
photographs of purged leaders were quickly withdrawn from 
circulation, the story recounted that foreign 
correspondents who tried to buy the official photograph of 
11 
the four were told that "none was available." The only 
pictures available for sale were of Hua, the story noted. 
On October 14, Butterfield reported, "China's 
information media have begun issuing strongly worded 
warnings against 'conspiracies' as Chinese officials 
12 
continued their silence today." The story quoted a 
Chinese local radio as announcing that "we must be united 
very closely around the Party center headed by Comrade Hua 
64 
13 
Guofeng and resolutely uphold the unity of the Party." 
Based on the radio announcement, Butterfield was convinced 
that "members of the so-called ~moderates' among Peking's 
14 
leaders had increased their authority." 
Meanwhile, more facts of the purge were revealed 
through dazibao, the unofficial means of disseminating 
information among the people themselves. On October 15, 
1976, Butterfield wrote in "Wall Posters in China Charge 
Four Leftists With Plotting Against Party" that dazibao in 
Shanghai, Beijing and other cities were expressing 
sentiment against the four Shanghai radicals. A Shanghai 
dazibao identified the "Four" by name and denounced them 
15 
as an "antiparty plot group." The story also showed 
that some dazibao read, "·crush the heads of the four 
dogs;" others wrote, "Crush and strangle the gang of 
16 
four." 
As Hua's position was increasingly confirmed; more 
army and provincial leaders pledged their support. The 
Beijing Garrison was among the first to do so. The Times 
reported on October 17 that China's elite Beijing Garrison 
"pledged allegiance" to Hua after a weekend of mass 
17 
demonstrations against his opponents." The reporter 
quoted a front-page story in the People's Daily which 
said, "the garrison had sworn to win new victories under 
the Party's Central Committee headed by Hua, who has 
succeeded Mao Tse-tung as Chairman of the Communist Party 
65 
18 
and leader of China." the People's Daily also declared 
that the Beijing Garrison would "battle resolutely against 
~factionalists' and plotters." At the end, the writer 
remarked that in Shanghai, "some of the marchers carried 
effigies of Jiang dangling on a noose and banners bore her 
name in big ideographic characters drawn to look like 
19 
bones." 
Another story about dazibao on October 18, titled 
"Poster Says Wife Tried to Kill Mao," indicated that a 
dazibao on the campus of Beijing University charged that 
Jiang Qing "personally tried to kill Mao on his 
20 
deathbed." The story attributed the dazibao to some 
physics students of Beijing University, who supplied a 
"dra.rilatic version of the events surrounding Mao's death on 
21 
Sept. 9." The dazibao read, "When Chairman Mao was 
gravely ill, Jiang Qing did not care .... When Chairman 
Mao's illness reached its crisis, Jiang Qing disregarded 
opposition and obstacles from the doctor and attempted to 
22 
kill him." 
Based on sources from Hong Kong, Butterfield reported 
at the end of October that Jiang reportedly "took out 
several of Mao's documents from the Communist Party's 
23 
special archives and reworded them." Hua reportedly 
discovered that Jiang Qing had obtained the documents 
"without proper permission." Hua immediately ordered Jiang 
to return the documents and then "discovered the 
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24 
alterations." The Hong Kong source indicated that this 
was one of the reasons that Hua decided to arrest her and 
her associates. In Butterfield's analysis the account 
25 
"sounded highly plausible." Furthermore, the story 
quoted a Chinese official in Hong Kong who said that the 
26 
story appeared to be "based on facts." 
In the same story, Butterfield wrote that one poster 
addressed Jiang and her associates as the "four poisonous 
27 
insects." He commented that Jiang's unpopularity 
stemmed from her attacks on too many "old-time" Party 
28 
leaders during CR. 
By the end of October, The Times had printed 32 
stories about the Gang of Four. The content of the stories 
during·the month was consistent, except that by the end of 
the month the tone became more and more certain as the 
events unfolded. 
On the last day of October-, The Times ran an opinion 
piece written by Allen S. Whiting, professor of political 
science at the University of Michigan, anticipating that 
the fall of Jiang Qing and her associates might bring 
29 
closer U.S.-China relations. Professor Whiting said that 
the fall of the Gang of Four "removes the most poisonous 
30 
elements in Peking affecting Sino-American relations." 
He perceived the "Four" as "the primary obstacle" on the 
Chinese side toward the normalization of the relations 
31 
between the two countries. Whiting noted that under the 
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control of radical policies, "the propagandized images of 
the United States were u.s. imperialism,' 'American 
32 
devils,' 'aggressors' and 'plunderers.'" The professor 
explained that history books for China's younger 
generation asserted that in the 1950s, "the U.S. 
imperialists suddenly began an aggressive attack on Korea 
with the mad ambition to seize Korea and continue on to 
33 
attack China." 
However, Jiang Qing's hard-line foreign policy did 
not stand alone. Her supporters echoed her views on many 
occasions. Whiting recalled that in July 1976, Zhang 
Chunqiao "shocked American visitors by ruling out the 
34 
'peaceful liberation qf Taiwan' as a viable option." 
Since Zhang was Deputy Prime Minister, and chief political 
commissar of the armed forces, "his hard line was dutifully 
echoed by other officials in Peking and in China's liaison 
35 
office in Washington." 
Wang Hongwen's support of anti-American policy was 
reflected at the lOth Party Congress when he was named 
Vice Chairman of the Party. In his speech to this 
Congress, Wang "warned against a surprise attack' by 
36 
imperialism and social-imperialism." 
Although Yao Wenyuan did not address foreign policy 
in public, he exercised tight control over China's major 
official media apparatus. Whiting asserted that Yao "was 
37 
responsible for implementing Jiang Qing's line." 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY 
Summary and Discussion 
The Cultural Revolution has been viewed by both 
Chinese and Western writers as a power struggle among 
China's top leadership and as a brutal attack on millions 
of Chinese people. This thesis has outlined four major 
events that took place between 1966 and 1976; at the same 
ti~e, it has reviewed The New York Times reporting on 
China during the CR. 
The major events have been summarized chronologically 
as the purge of Liu Shaoqi, the rise and fall of Lin Biao, 
Nixon's China visit and the arrests of the "Gang of Four." 
The picture of inhumane suffering that millions of Chinese 
people experienced was presented through the accounts by 
survivors of and writers on the CR, such as Liang, Gao, 
Cheng, Thurston, Salisbury and Butterfield. 
Due to historical limitations, most stories reported 
by The Times from 1966 to 1976 were off-spot-coverage. The 
only exception was the coverage of Nixon's visit, during 
which reporter Max Frankel traveled with the President. 
The Times foreign correspondents had watched China from 
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Hong Kong office and moved to Beijing only in 1979, three 
years after the CR officially ended. 
During the CR, The Times also used numerous stories 
from sources of other countries, such as Reuters, Agence 
France-Press, the Canadian Globe and Mail, and Tanyug, the 
Yugoslav press agency. 
The major sources of the stories from China were 
official newspapers and radio broadcasts, often seriously 
slanted. However, The Times reporters' knowledge of China 
helped them explain, analyse and interpret what was going 
on. For example, during the Lin Biao incident, the Chinese 
government and the media had kept silent for ten months 
about Lin's sudden disappearance. In this case, there was 
no official account for the foreign correspondent. 
However, six months before the Chinese government 
officially disclosed the news, The Times reporters had 
read between lines of Chinese media and had put forth a 
series of logical speculations on the likely status of Lin 
Biao and his followers. 
The Times speculated and analysed the arrests of the 
"Gang of Four" under similar conditions. The reporters 
based their observation on the fact that the official 
pictures of the "Four" had been withdrawn from circulation 
and speculated that the "Four" must have been purged. They 
made the best of the situation by whatever channels were 
available and dug out information via sources from Hong 
72 
Kong, spoken words from government officials and from 
dazibao. Again, The Times conclusion coincided with the 
fate of the "Four" announced by the Chinese government 
much later. 
It is not an exaggeration for Salisbury to say that 
The Times is a "newspaper of record." It has recorded each 
major event including three major power struggles and 
Nixon's visit, which have been included in this thesis. In 
each power struggle when a person emerged among the 
leading group or disappeared from the political scene, The 
Times was able to follow the changes and to provide fairly 
complete background information on each major political 
figure. 
In Nixon's visit, The Times provided full and 
detailed coverage and analysis of China's foreign policy 
and its foreign relations in its stories and editorials. 
Details were given in the stories about Nixon's landing in 
China, the reception banquet, the Joint Communique and 
Nixon's departure from China. The stories recounted the 
subtle changes in the relations between the two countries 
as the visit unfolded. 
However, during the CR, The Times stories had very 
few details about the brutality and inhumane treatment 
that millions of Chinese people experienced. The facts 
about the deaths of more than one million people and those 
who shared similar experiences, like Liang Heng, Gao Yuan, 
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Nien Cheng and Yue Daiyun, were not found in The Times 
stories. Many stories about the wide purge were revealed 
only in the aftermath by insiders and survivors. To answer 
the research question raised earlier in this thesis, that 
is, how well The Times reported the CR between 1966 and 
1976, the conclusion is, that the newspaper kept a good 
record of each power struggle and other major events but 
missing was an account of the deaths and brutal treatment 
experienced by many well known intellectuals, government 
officials, writers, film stars, sports stars and millions 
of other victims of the CR. This omission can be 
attributed to the limitations of the off-spot-coverage. 
Recommendations 
This thesis has presented a historical summary of 
four major events in the CR, while examining how well The 
New York Times reported on China during the CR. Future 
researchers might select other events of interest. 
It might be interesting to examine the Chinese 
version of the CR from the People's Daily, China's 
official newspaper, or other sources, or compare the 
Chinese sources with western sources. 
It also may be of interest to select sources other 
than The New York Times, or make make comparison between 
The New York Times with other sources, such as the London 
Times or the Los Angeles Times. 
74 
It is also recommended that further studies be done 
through quantitative content analysis. 
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APPENDIX A 
MAJOR EVENTS IN THE CR 
1966 
May "May 16 Circular," the first important document 
August 
1967 
January 
April 
1968 
June 
in the Cultural Revolution. 
First dazibao appears at Beijing University. 
Red Guards make formal debut in Beijing. 
People's Liberation Army intervenes in the CR. 
Liu Shaoqi officially denounced as "China's 
Khrushchev." 
Violence on upswing throughout China. Red Guards 
raid military arsenals, turn captured weapons 
on rival factions. 
September Mao calls for the Red Guards to be sent to rural 
areas to be "reeducated" by peasants. 
October Liu Shaoqi expelled from the Party. 
1969 
March Armed conflict between China and the Soviet 
Union breaks out on the border. 
April Ninth Party Congress meets. Lin Biao formally 
named Mao's legal successor. 
November Death of Liu Shaoqi. 
77 
78 
1970 
October Canada extends formal diplomatic recognition to 
China. 
1971 
September Death of Lin Biao following a failed coup 
attempt. 
October China seated in the U.N. 
1972 
February Nixon visits China. 
1976 
January Death of Zhou Enlai. 
September Death of Mao Zedong 
October Arrest of the Gang of Four. 
~PPENDIX B 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
Deng Xiaoping 
Secretary-general of the Secretariat of the Chinese 
Communist Party before the CR. Deng became a main target 
of criticism but emerged as the key architect of the 
subsequent economic and political reforms. He is currently 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which ordered 
gunfire be used against the students demostrating at 
Beijing Tiananmen Square. 
Jiang Qing 
Mao's widow. She was one of the Gang of Four. 
Lin Biao 
Defense Minister before the CR. He was named Mao's legal 
successor in the Ninth Party Congress in 1969. In 1971, he 
died in a plane crash in Mongolia, allegedly trying to 
flee to the Soviet Union after his plot to assassinate Mao 
failed. 
Liu Shaoqi 
President of China before the CR. He became the main 
target of the CR and died in custody. 
Mao Zedong 
Long time Party Chairman. He dominated Chinese politics 
for about 40 years. Died in 1976. 
Wang Hongwen 
Vice Chairman of the Party after the Tenth Party Congress. 
One of the Gang of Four. 
Yao Wenyuan 
Propagandist who controlLed media during the CR. 
Zhang Chunqiao 
Vice Premier before his arrest in 1976. He was one of the 
Gang of Four. 
Zhou Enlai 
Long time Premier before he died in 1976. 
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